Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112480

## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

## **MEMORANDUM**

29 Dec 1969

## MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ALLEN

Attached is the latest "final" draft of the ELINT Resources paper. I believe this version contains the corrections you desired (previous draft and your notes also attached).

This draft is presently being reviewed by Adm. Showers, DIA for Plans and General Morrison, NSA Director for Production.

If you approve, a final copy will be forwarded to Dr. McLucas for signature.

Would appreciate a response by 7 January.

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COMPARTMENTATION

CHAPTER THE SETTING COMMENT

1. TASK. To respond to the following question posed by the Principal Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering.

Address the matter of classification of satellite raw data and the constraints this classification places on its effective use in fusion with COMINT information or with non-codeword sources where required.

## 2. DISCUSSION.

- a. ELINT and telemetry collected by satellites is essential for the production of intelligence on foreign country weapons systems. The military services are both a consumer and producter of this form of finished intelligence, however, in this dual role they are severely handicapped.
- b. In the past there has been an insufficient amount of data available on overhead SIGINT collection systems to provide optimal planning for and utilization of the resulting products. This was primarily due to the fact that the vital sensor information and processing procedures were primarily available only in the BYEMAN system, while the user community was TALENT-KEYHOLE indoctrinated. The NRO has agreed to prepare TALENT-KEYHOLE mission descriptions which are now being distributed to the user community to enable maximum exploitation of the product and insure adequate information for planning of exploitation and utilization of future missions. NSA has insured that similar information is available concerning processing procedures.
- c. The present system of decompartmentalizing overhead collected SIGINT product data is cumbersome and not responsive to the needs of the consumer community to insure dissemination of significant intelligence data at no higher than the SECRET level. It is imperative that a meaningful and responsive

APPENDIX D

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sanitization and decontrol procedure be established by SORS for this purpose, if overhead sources product are to be effectively fused with COMINT or non-codeword product information.

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Replace Enclosure 1, Page 3, Para 11A with:

"In full recognition of the requirement for protection of information concerning the unique facets of U.S. Satellite capabilities which must be afforded continuous stringent protection, it is recommended that SORS establish meaningful and effective methodology and procedures for decompartmentation of overhead SIGINT product to permit maximum consumer distribution in a timely manner at no higher than the SECRET level."

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DIA believes it will be necessary in the future that additional detail on the capabilities of overhead collection systems be made available in order that the planning for and utilization of the resulting products can be effectively accomplished and the shortcomings of such collection be recognized. The NRO is in the process of preparing TKH mission descriptions which will provide all information essential to meeting this objective.

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE COMIN!

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PRESENTE / CONTROL BYENGE STORY

DIA believes that the BYENN-SIGNY-information available within the DoD cannot be adequately utilized due to the limited number of people who are authorized BYEMAN access. If present and future SIGINT planning involving conventional and overhead resource allocation by DoD is to be realistic, then it is important that increased numbers of people have access to RETAIN SIGINT information. Hopefully, a net increase in the numbers of people authorized Briden information will enhance planning and utilization of SIGINT overhead collection vehicles as well as enhance tasking to meet DoD SIGINT requirements.

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CHANGE AND A

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1.	Ву :	31 August 1970, NRO will have published within the TALENT KEYHOLE					
sys	em,	detailed SIGINT mission descriptions for at least the Poppy, mens 710X;					
		Tivioli, msns 73%%; Strawman, msns 716%					
and	7232	23%. The SIGINT sensor manuals will provide at a minimum: . Design characteristics (RF coverage, etc.)					
	a.						
	b.	Purpose of mission  Type of receiver (crystal video, superheterodyne, etc.)					
	c.						
	d.	System sensitivity, including wehicle antenna gain estimates if possible					
	e.	Receiver bandwidth(s)					
	£.	Receiver mode during intercept (scanning, lock tuned, automatic					

- g. Magnetic recording bandwidths(s) and recording duration
- h. Signal parameter accuracies

recognition characteristics, etc.)

- i. Date-time intercept accuracy
- j. Location accuracy (of emitter, if possible, or vehicle)
- 2. With the release of the information on all NRO SIGINT collection systems within the TALENT KEYHOLE community, 80% of which is in DoD, there may no longer be an information problem within the DoD intelligence community either for planning resource use or intelligence production.
- 3. Any specific cases requiring additional information not included in TK data would require BYEMAN access. NRO and DIA will jointly review access procedures to resolve any BYEMAN access requirements.

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